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Response: 
A reaction by Joseph Gravina to the paper entitled 
Promoting Democratic Citizenship: an exploration of the 
current educational debate about what students at the 
beginning of the 21st century should be encouraged to 
understand by the concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘citizenship’  
by Philip Caruana that appeared in the last issue of JMER. 
 
Abstract:  
 
This paper is a critical reading of Philip Caruana’s study of citizenship 
education and is based on a theoretical analysis of, amongst others, his 
suggestion to synthesise national identity and shared fate concepts in order to 
improve the effectiveness of education for citizenship. The promotion of 
democratic citizenship is considered restrictive both because it is intended to 
mould as well as because it applies exclusively what it considers ‘liberal’ ideals.  
 
The critical exercise leads to the reworking of a broader programme for which 
the main areas of knowledge are traced: the state, the economy and culture. 
This, it is claimed, along with a relevant contribution of studies about the 
Maltese experience related to the study, also prepares for a return of social and 
economic interests to citizenship education. At the same time, a wider global 
view of world events is attempted, away from institutionalised canonical 
versions. Only in this way, it is claimed, can a political education curriculum be 
more effective. 
 
‘Please sir, I want some more.’  
When programmes in education for democracy  
and citizenship  do not reach out far enough. 
 
‘Please sir, I want some more.’ When programmes in education for democracy 
and citizenship do not reach out far enough. 
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1. Introduction: the Liberal mould. 
 
Although Caruana (2006) departs from a small section of the post-secondary syllabus 
for Systems of Knowledge, the first module amongst four entitled ‘Democracy and 
Citizenship’, he moves on to discuss issues that go far beyond the mere limits of a 
single school subject, albeit a subject that is obligatory for University of Malta 
admission and enrolment. Unfortunately, he starts off with a rather unwarranted and 
patronising touch as he suggests he will address “what students at the beginning of the 
21st century should be encouraged to understand” by the concepts of ‘democracy’ and 
‘citizenship’ (p.67)1. One can argue of course that it is one of the responsibilities of 
intellectuals to share with the public their analyses and even come up with proposals 
and ideas supported by strong reasons, but it can also be asserted that in the past, the 
Maltese educational sector has had its fair amount of institutionally supported frock-
clad and suit-dressed purveyors of the truth who have imposed (and continue to do so) 
their shoulds and should nots to excuse a certain distrustfulness on the reader’s part2.  
 
Our initial fear and unease for the prescriptive nature of the essay are proved correct 
and justified when, later in his contribution, Caruana exposes what apparently had 
been the over-arching intent accompanying the build-up of his main argument. In the 
latter half of the article in fact he presents a set of guideline indicators to introduce 
and explain better his preferred liberal programme and, at that point, Macedo’s 
political agenda features heavily. Facing one of the main challenges in the traditions 
of ideological crusade, namely how to create the ideal citizen in concrete practice, 
Macedo argues that the construction of a liberal “critical mass of citizens with 
appropriate moral commitments and affective attachments cannot be left to chance” 
because “liberal citizens do not come into existence naturally” (Caruana, 2006: 73). 
Whilst premising (in Caruana’s words) that a “just regime” does not “adapt itself” to 
its citizens, he therefore advocates that it “must consciously mould citizens who share 
a sufficiently cohesive political identity” (ibid).  
 
If we ignore the ‘naturalist’ thread and place the argument where it may bear more 
epistemologically rewarding fruits - the politico-ideological context - it will be 
possible to offer at least one suggestion why it has been so difficult for intellectuals, 
whose declared aim is to mould others with their liberalism, to achieve their goal3. 
The class basis of this politico-ideological practice proposed by Macedo, and by 
association Caruana, may go unnoticed because sociologically, the concept of class 
has become less clear since class appurtenance is run through transversally by socially 
relevant identities such as gender, sexual orientation, race or ethnicity. However, 
ideological practice complements and is contemporaneous to class division and 
therefore does not start at a specific point but is permanent in class-based social 
formations. It is more firmly rooted and therefore anticipates Macedo’s deliberate 
strategy. The difficulty of spreading or popularising liberal ideas through subjecting 
                                                 
1
  This and all other italics in the essay are mine, unless a note indicates otherwise.  
2
 This was highlighted in Wain’s strong argument against the paternalism of the authorities, political 
and educational, in his diatribe against the then prevalent practices in terms of curricular debate and 
development. See Wain (1991). 
3The rejection of liberalism on the macro-regional scale in post-war Europe paradoxically followed a 
war against Fascist and Nazi antiliberalism. The Liberal Parties were pushed aside by voters in post-
war elections and one reason for their defeat was that they were without close connections with the 
popular classes and therefore deprived of an electoral base. See, Gill and Law (1994). 
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members of another class to ideological practice does not therefore arise from lack of 
trying but from the indelible resistance of class ‘instinct’ derived from the social 
relations founded at the economic level4. This unschooled anti-liberal trigger was a 
favourite with Maltese social democrats, who throughout were accompanied for a 
number of different reasons in fighting ‘liberal’ threats by a strange bed-fellow, 
conservative clericalism. Extending beyond national frontiers, religious obstruction to 
rampant liberalism (a neo version) has become a common ideological stand against 
westernisation and its raison d’etre, globalised capitalism, at least that controlled by 
the advanced capitalist economies.  
 
Undeterred by all this, Caruana still proposes ‘moulding’ and although he does not 
find anything morally dubious in the process, still manifests a certain disquiet in the 
need to justify it all by asking us to take him for his word and believe in all faith that 
“to mould” is not truly “questionable ethically” but “should be taken in a positive 
connotation” (p.73). In a way, he is right (although nowhere does it surface that this is 
his line of argument) because education as a politico-ideological activity implicitly 
involves ‘some’ moulding, and sometimes explicitly even more than that. What he 
does not discuss and therefore justify is such matters as who is to decide about the 
moulding both as process and content. Bereft of accompanying arguments, and whilst 
the discussion is still on, we ask why liberal and only liberal? Is this liberalism a self-
evident truth, a political belief, or perhaps something else?5 Without answers to these 
queries, the ‘moulding’ we are asked to consider becomes palliative at best, but when 
located within a broader neoliberal framework can turn out to be deceitful.  
 
2. National and shared fate citizenship duality 
 
Our misgivings are not placated when the citizenship debate develops into the 
‘national identity’ and ‘shared fate’ citizenship duality. Having and holding on to a 
national identity, we read, is anything but easy: “it is difficult to imagine how a 
society can maintain the same identity with all the movements of citizens, 
globalisation, and the way the world is evolving” (p.72)6. So, bowing to rather hastily 
described global phenomena, national identity as a concept of citizenship is 
transformed into membership in a community of shared fate, within (one assumes) a 
national but also an international sphere. Multiculturalist societies demand it and 
global media and communication create the space and technological means to achieve 
it on the broader scale. This extension however sounds the alarm. Heater’s “feeling of 
universal identity and the acceptance of universal morality” spills the beans (Caruana, 
2006: 73). Caruana raises the stakes and attempts to establish a connection between 
Macedo’s ‘cohesive political identities’ at national identity level and this shared fate 
‘universal morality’. Huntington may not be convinced, but neither will the political 
left.  
 
                                                 
4
 Further elaborations on instinct and class distinctions see Poulantzas (1975) and Laclau (1977).  
5
 The social democratic experiment carried out in continental Europe (and Malta) in the last century, a 
political and economic experience not without faults of course, is brushed aside without a thought. See 
Giddens (1998), included amongst Caruana’s references. 
6
 This stubborn dedication to the liberal way(s) is amply attested by the subject-matter and general 
approach in the new publication intended for post-secondary education Systems of Knowledge: A 
Multidisciplinary Approach (various editors) especially the section edited by Caruana on democratic 
values and citizenship. 
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In fact when the author suggests we are influenced by norms and values as an 
“automatic process that cannot be halted” (p.74), we ask whether what he proposes 
can ever happen7. Global media and communication technologies have transformed 
access to western cultural products and ideas. The point is that it does not follow at all 
to consider media impact as ‘automatic’. The drilled repeatability and uncontrollable 
pervasiveness indicate, according to Adorno (1996), that it is the culturally degraded 
intention to push for consumerist psychology. The contradictory reactions one gets 
from empirical research in cultural responses to global media onslaught indicate 
however that responses may be surprising and contradictory8. And so it is difficult to 
understand how Caruana is to turn back what is ‘automatic’ especially when the 
bibliography suggested at the end of the article does not include any Maltese 
contribution. If ‘national identity’ has a role to play in his ‘shared fate’, than the 
criteria of relevance and concreteness demand its exploration. Even its absence 
remains of course analytically valuable. Otherwise the entire construct based on the 
two categories has to be dropped. Without any traction from the ‘national’ context, 
not only do we miss the ‘shared fate’ stage (what are we going to share anyway?) but, 
based on the ‘absence’ of a local identity, we are up for grabs9. This, possibly, also 
answers the query why Caruana sees the spread of globalisation as ‘automatic’.  
 
Historical reference and the international scenario may assist us in understanding at 
least partly what is involved and why educators in democracy and citizenship need to 
be bothered. The Atlantic pact was a first postwar stage of capitalist (and liberal) 
cohesion building; without the Soviet threat, the strategy could now be extended 
further, in fact globalised.  The US administration however does not want to rule the 
world, writes Amin, it just wants to pillage it10. And there is no real interest in 
democracy. Kuwait was not democratised. So are hegemonic schemes, fruit of 
conspiracy theorists working on global scales? The links between liberal argument 
and international colonial interests are well-known11. On an ideological scale, during 
the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century it was socialism that had an 
internationalist bent; now it appears there has been an increase in the 
internationalisation of a liberal creed, termed neoliberalism (Anderson, 2002; Amin, 
2004) supporting the globalised economy. FDI, IMF, World Bank, WTO, unilateral 
aggressive military and trade policies, almost unrestricted macro-regional expansion 
in Eastern Europe, I am sure all have their rationally justified role to play in a grand 
scheme of world capitalist development, and yet they do provoke an itch, and there is 
                                                 
7
 In ‘A Historical Science of Society’ from The German Ideology, Marx whilst outlining the active 
involvement of the human factor, proposes to ascend from earth to heaven. Others, he adds, prefer to 
depart from heaven to come to earth (p.17). 
8
 Morley (1994), p.155, especially notes 25, 26 and 27. Also, Gravina (2003), in ‘The media and the 
news’. Radical groups can use these means. 
9
 Paul Piccone remarks, "In Gramsci, the logic of the whole, unencumbered by a fatalistic Marxist 
theory of history, can grasp the particular without reducing it to an extension of that logic and thereby 
suffocating its uniqueness and specificity." See Landy (1994), p.42. Giddens felt the need to point a 
counter-tendency in his ‘Foreword’ for Sultana and Baldacchino (1994), p.xxix: ‘Malta cannot be 
studied, it is demonstrated over and over again, as though it were an isolated unit. It is part of a wider 
global society and the influence of the wider global order appears almost everywhere’. 
10
 This may explain, at least in part, one of the main differences in the British management of empire 
and the postwar American version: the former exported imperial functionaries all over the world and 
these were in direct contact with the colonised ‘national’ territory, the latter does not. 
11
 Laclau, for example, mentions the symptomatic liberal “mythology according to which everything 
colonial was identified with stagnation and all things European with progress”. See Laclau (1971) 
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very little to remove the itch12. This is a gloomier perception of Caruana’s suggested 
concept, ‘shared fate’, and Fukuyama’s trumpeted epitaph, a liberal democracy that is 
the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and final form of government, in 
other words, the end of history. 
 
As for the Americans, the lessons from the Vietnam War are still alive. Back home, 
the liberal national identity has to be appeased. Which does not mean of course that 
liberal appeals to bridge the us/them divide, educate for the politically correct 
disposition of impartiality, or the appeal of individual rights (part of Caruana’s 
concoction) while intending to revive13 democratic and citizenship debate 
paradoxically do not serve the opposite purpose: a moralistic cover-up for genuine 
democratic politics, Mouffe’s ‘reality of conflict’ (2005: 149). She premises that 
modern democratic politics linked to the  human rights universal declaration, another 
major ‘universalist’ postwar agenda, “imply” a “reference to universality” but only as 
a “horizon that can never be reached” and a “content” that “must remain 
indeterminate” (pp.146-7). In other words, division remains indelible, both nationally 
and globally. Paradoxically of course, this should not create impossible difficulties to 
grasp, seeing that it is within the nature of democracy and capitalism, after all, to be 
divisive systems. But it does run counter to any idealistic universality and sharpens 
Macedo’s reference to national cohesiveness rather than opens it up.  
 
If the world scenario is complex, local realities may assist in focussing on the 
consequences14. At the local level, the crisis in social reproduction patterns especially 
in certain important conditions of long-term social development such as social 
integration, education and culture, natural resources and ecological safety mentioned 
by Brie (2006) indicate that society is not unaffected. The relative weakening of the 
family and the state in some of their core functions is paradoxically accompanied by a 
drive towards educational, health and political reforms meant to guarantee elementary 
services and equality of chances when economic policies schizophrenically threaten 
the foundations of such reforms, undermine them, and at worst make them impossible. 
Privatisation and the extension of market-economy competition to the private sector 
(even if not necessarily the very big guns) but also the public, the commitment to an 
even more far-reaching deregulation of state control over finance streams, the 
deregulation and further commodification of the labour market are processes that 
neoliberalist inroads and their ‘disintegrative consequences’ intend to impose, against 
any resistance (ibid.): more liberty for less welfare. Asking capitalists to carry a social 
responsibility that runs counter to their interests is indeed a worrying sign-post.  
 
3. Defining ‘democracy’ 
 
Focussing on democracy within the context of the nation-state, seeing that democracy 
in macro-regional or indeed global spaces is more or less a concession to formal 
frameworks rather than significant decision-making processes, we need to identify 
attempts to elaborate a meaningful conceptual presentation of democracy. Whilst 
Caruana (2006) rightly refers to the many definitions of the concept, we find it is not 
                                                 
12
 The democracy we are familiar with works (when it does) in a nation-wide system with its self-
imposed rules but the world economy does not share the same organisation and legitimation.  
13
 Revive? Dworkin (2006), instead of addressing socio-economic aspects for the terrible mess in the 
US democratic debate continues to follow the ‘pure’ civil and political liberal path. 
14
 Amin (1997). 
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problematised in depth. And so when it is suggested that “if one reflects on the 
different governments of the world, one is likely to conclude that most people in the 
world favour democracy over other types of government”, we are left in a quandary 
(p.68). For a start, asking people who today live in a ‘representative’ democracy of the 
Western world whether they would opt for a dictatorial, fundamentalist, colonial or 
monarchical regime, does not really push the argument too far ahead. The merits one 
guarantees for one’s democratic pedigree are minimal. It would have been better to 
ask in which democracy one desired to live.  
 
Then there is the alternative matter of asking others who do not live in such a 
democracy whether they would prefer the Western system. And what does one get for 
a reply?15 Self-evident truths such as the preference for ‘democracy’ against a non-
democratic regime are questioned. And the query is anything but superficial because it 
lies in the fundamental premise of any democratic belief that whosoever is considered 
to form part of the democratic polity has a right to have a say, one way or another, in 
decision-making. When the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the majority of votes in 
the first stage of the national legislative elections held in December 1991 in Algeria, 
the army intervened and elections were disrupted, the party on its way to rule was 
made illegal and its members hunted down in spite of its majority democratic support. 
The democratic process of the elections was not in doubt; opponents objected about a 
future threat against democracy by the fundamentalists. Then again, assuming this 
was a plausible possibility, had not the people chosen democratically this path?  
 
If the assumed anti-democratic threats of the FIS in Algeria may have justified the 
over-ruling of the sovereign rights of the Algerians to their democratic choice (i.e. the 
fundamentalists would not have allowed the Algerians a future democratic choice), 
recent Palestinian elections provide a situation more difficult to justify. The 
Palestinians who through incredible hardships have maintained a democratic approach 
to politics whilst at the same time keeping radical Islam under control (which goes a 
long way in teaching their neighbours, friend and foe, about democratic politics) 
elected Hamas to government. The diplomatic activity, anything but surprising, to 
influence and change the democratic decisions of the Palestinians by the US and Israel 
most prominently but also by the EU, was a challenge from outside (although the 
spatial connotation in the case of Palestine is anything but clear) to the sovereign 
rights of the Palestinians16. In this case, the elected party was accused of threatening 
the peace. An understandable and morally hurt reply points out that Israelis regularly 
vote war-mongerers to government. A deeper consideration about democracy emerges 
that goes beyond the merely descriptive-definitional or moralistic level. In the cases 
we mentioned as well as others, democracy as a vehicle for people’s choice (a more 
agreeable proposal than Caruana’s high-flowing ‘people prefer democracy’ populism) 
                                                 
15
 The landslide victory in 1990 for Milosevic in Serbia's first multiparty elections since World War II 
and anti-Chinese revolts in 1998 in Indonesia’s return to democracy. And so we question Graham’s 
terse argument about democracy having a special ‘contingent’ rather than ‘conceptual’ attribute: 
“justification and defence of political systems must come to an end in contingent facts not conceptual 
truths”. See Graham (1983), p.95.  
16
 Palestine is merely the last emphatic example. American Liberals and Conservatives (and the 
respective neo-versions) have been consistent on this. Chile in the 1970s and Nicaragua in the 1980s 
were not Islamic. They were however democratic. As for Palestine, the absolute lack of balance in 
power makes European diplomacy, at least at times, look ridiculous. The aid donor carrot however is 
perverse. See text adopted by the EU Parliament on 2nd February, 2006 from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu. 
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is subordinated to other interests related to national or regional power (im)balance, 
and even deeper inter-connected interests such as global monopolies17. However that 
demands a new articulation with a different set of arguments which takes us away 
from Caruana’s article and our present concern. 
 
The question regarding people’s desire for democracy is either naively honest or 
appeasing. If the former, it is idealistic and easily manipulated by the ideological 
undertones of the latter. And yet even as an academic exercise this question does not 
lead us anywhere in particular18. Impossible to answer because we have not yet 
established at least the contours of the concept, not even historical innuendos assist 
us: our democratic models share very few commonalities with the Athenian 
experiment mentioned in the essay even if Huntington’s comment (reported by 
Caruana) that we should shy away from the Athenian ‘democratic’ system because the 
“highest offices were allocated by lottery” and its disquieting vulnerability to the 
“persuasive voices of irresponsible demagogues” leave us unimpressed. His focus on 
process is understandable, seeing his democratic concerns, but it is also true that the 
Athenians used ‘lottery’ so they could fight nepotism or other corruption. They also 
disliked or hated voting (a strong reason one presumes for Huntington’s distaste) only 
because they believed in self-representation. As for demagoguery, a study of 
Gramscian hegemony should indicate that it may not be the most efficient technique 
for long-term control of a people’s consciousness. Huntington certainly knows about 
this. Of course nothing here is meant to imply the Athenians were perfect. In fact they 
were impressive because they faced their weaknesses straight on. 
 
4. The concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘citizenship’: Caruana’s argument 
 
Caruana sticks to his guns and sees the task of finding “consensus on definition and 
approach” to democracy “a priority” (p.69). It appears however that Kerr, quoted by 
the author for validation of his thesis, sees the situation differently. The latter 
emphasises the importance of redefining concepts like democracy and citizenship 
only as “a by-product of a much larger, wide-ranging debate concerning the changing 
nature of citizenship in modern society and the role of education within that society” 
(p.69). The two are related but Kerr changes the priority order which, he argues, is 
due to a “less certain post modern world” (p.69). In other words, unless we get down 
to suggesting what the changing nature of citizenship is all about, we do not move the 
debate forward. Undeterred by the philosophical impasse and Kerr’s challenge for a 
redefinition of citizenship, the author pushes forward with definition and amongst the 
hundreds of definitions, he prefers those “most adhered to in the west” and these are 
uncritically attached to educational curricula (p.70). It is from these that we are to 
‘evaluate’ government’s ‘authentic’ functioning, that is functioning “as close as 
                                                 
17
 According to Amin (1997), the centres of global power have five monopolies over the peripheries: 
technological monopoly, especially military, which only large investments can guarantee; financial 
monopoly guaranteed by the control of worldwide financial markets of what previously circulated 
within largely national financial institutions: finance capital; the monopoly access to the planet’s 
natural resources; media and communications monopolies allowing political manipulation, uniformity 
of culture, erosion of democratic practices, and expansion of media market; and finally, there are 
weapons of mass destruction over which the US holds a clear-cut monopoly.  
18
 Students may even dream of being a prime minister for one day as they are invited to do in the 
Systems of Knowledge text. Imaginative but pathetic if not balanced by critical questioning. Why not 
consider a fifty year old citizen-worker who ends up unemployed? Or another who wants to learn what 
s/he has always missed because of the need to work to make a decent living. 
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possible to the basic norms and values” (p.70) 19. Why? Because “it is well recognised 
that the European states, individually or as a European Union, have in these last years 
intensified their concern and effort to devise curricula that would be best suited to 
promote values within their societies, and to promote societal cohesion” (p.70). 
Intensity of effort does not of course equal justification.  
 
And so, pace Kerr, we are presented with Patrick who argues that any debate about 
democracy should start with “minimal democracy” (p.70). This is where the author 
stumbles across Huntington who offers the following: a political system is 
“democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are 
selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” 
(p.70). According to Caruana, this minimal, mainly procedural definition implies an 
emphasis on popular sovereignty, or government by the consent of the governed, 
where the government is directly or indirectly accountable to the people. If we were to 
assume, only for argument’s sake, that this suggestion has any foundation at all, it has 
to be argued that this only works at a ‘minimal’ level otherwise one is hard-pressed to 
find any substantial exercise in sovereignty in it. Competition and participation at 
least as minimally defined by Huntington necessitate civil and political freedoms to 
speak, publish, assemble, and organise as the bare necessities for political debate and 
the conduct of regular electoral campaigns to proceed without impediment. This 
periodic media event is firmly rooted in the more sober Rights of Man tradition with 
an emphasis, amongst others, on opposition parties’ freedom from being denied, 
curbed, or harassed whilst censorship is looked down upon.  
 
Huntington’s democracy is one in which the way elections are carried out is more 
important than anything else. That governments are inefficient or shortsighted, 
irresponsible or dominated by special interests, may perhaps be undesirable but not 
undemocratic. This is a minimal definition effective in knocking out radical Left 
alternatives and highlights the freedom bias of the West. And yet one could easily 
have opted for other minimal definitions such as that by Wringe (1984) who explained 
how a democratic state, “at the very least” can only “exist for the sake of the people in 
it” and in that case included even the corporatist democracies of Eastern Europe and 
Asia (p.7). The central criterion however is not inclusion but the decision to opt for 
the substantive rather than the procedural principle. The choice for Huntington puts 
the author in a difficult position when he tackles the educational aspect. There he 
refers to “new forms of active citizenship” by Evans that demand the promotion of 
“the highest forms of learning with understanding, critical skills, and above all, 
lifelong learning and inquiry” because “knowing how is not the same as knowing 
why, and the social dynamics of the time demand that we know ‘why’ as well as 
‘how’” (Caruana, 2006: 72). And so it becomes difficult to understand the “positive 
connotations” (p.72) of Huntington’s ideas when all his system demands is a ready 
and steady pool of political cadres. 
 
5. Youth and education. 
 
Still recoiling from philosophical indeterminacy, political difficulties to reconcile 
norms with reality, and the disturbing ideological nature of educational moulding, 
                                                 
19
 See not 7 above. 
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another hurdle is dropped into our path – the purported disaffection of young people 
today. Particularly since the late Sixties, youth has been considered a social problem 
necessitating attention from a wide-ranging spectrum of interests including 
commercially-motivated breakthroughs as well as theses-seeking university research. 
In the essay we are offered readings that indicate young people today face a crisis 
and/or suffer from some undesirable attitude. Kerr, for example, refers to “the 
worrying signs of alienation and cynicism among young people about public life and 
participation, leading to their possible disconnection and disengagement with it”20. 
One of course queries whether they were connected or engaged at all before, and if 
they were, how. Evans describes two parallel phenomena: “young adults are 
experiencing an uncertain status and are dependent upon state and parental support for 
longer periods than would have been the case a generation ago” (Caruana, 2006: 69). 
It is not clear whether between the two, there is a consequential relation or else it is a 
case of concomitant development. This situation, Evans argues, has created a 
generation of youngsters who suffer uncertainty not because of knowledge but 
because it is a “manufactured uncertainty”21. Why the author does not follow this up 
is not known. He seems to steer away from the implications of the arguments raised 
by Evans and prefers to stick to her liberal choice-based individual propensities which 
emerge from “personal aspirations with available opportunities and their own values” 
(Caruana, 2006: 69) rather than the ‘objective’ contexts providing such opportunities: 
the domains of education, consumption, politics, work and family life22. If one is to 
talk about young people, albeit their citizenship and democratic experiences, can one 
not ‘socialise’ these contexts into the political debate? Is the reluctance to discuss the 
relationship between work and citizenship the same reason why the only main topic 
wiped off the ‘old’ Systems of Knowledge syllabus in relation to the ‘new’ was that of 
work and leisure?  
 
One final comment regarding Caruana’s paper is his observation of young people 
“taking things for granted”, an attitude which he considers is to blame for making 
“democracy so vulnerable” (p.70). With all the uncertainty around, it becomes 
interesting to find how they can take things for granted. More to the point however is 
to ask how they can be in a position to take things for granted in their experience of 
democratic life when they still lack enough substantial experience in it for this to 
occur; indeed an effort in democratic education is commendable (even if not restricted 
to the liberal model presented) because of the paucity of meaningful experiences in it 
and not because of people taking things for granted23. An even deeper reservation 
however runs throughout the youth debate in terms of the general approach followed 
                                                 
20
 Caruana (2006) found that 10.8% amongst the Junior College students participating in his survey 
thought the Maltese system was a direct democracy. Many reasons can be given but one is hard-pressed 
to take this to represent a purported youth crisis. 
21
 Actually, Evans adopts this term from Giddens. See, Karen Evans  Back to the future: are Britain’s 
reforms of post-16 education working? Accessed from http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight (date of 
accession: 02/03/2007).  
22
 The metaphors by Evans could have presented an alternative dimension for the sufferings of youth. 
See previous note. 
It becomes difficult to explain how liberals have found it difficult to attract youth when, if Hobsbawm 
is right about the young, they ‘can only be mobilised’ in the private sphere over such issues as 
lifestyles, environment, emancipatory gay rights or drugs’. The attractiveness of liberal belief is its 
penchant for freedoms. See Hobsbawm (2000), p.112 
23
 Unless of course Caruana refers to taking past democratic conquests for granted, the lack of respect 
towards which is undesirable, but considering it to blame for putting democracy in jeopardy is an 
exaggeration.  
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by the author who prefers to take attributes of a psychological nature - in short, 
youthful disenchantment - as a basis for the elaboration of a political education 
programme. This does not mean of course that people’s attitudes are insignificant, in 
fact it means the opposite as I shall argue briefly, they are so important that we must 
delve deeper than meets the eye, or fills the bountiful data sheets of interviews, so that 
we can understand better.  
 
Apparently the constitutional legislative and political branches, but also the wider 
cultural context have fallen short of favouring the democracy some liberals crave for, 
and so the remedy is (as with the partial solution of other perceived social crises) to 
turn to education. In this essay we shall argue otherwise and not necessarily because 
we intend to keep education out of the picture, but because education (or schooling to 
limit the range) is a branch of a larger structure, the state. And if that becomes too tall 
an order to confront then we can resign ourselves to patchwork. It takes time however 
and meanwhile we diligently note that democracy remains a contested concept 
stretching from an instrumental mechanism for decision-making processes to the 
ultimate test in normative civic conduct. Its problematisation is a desirable 
educational experience and schools, in spite of all other difficulties they have to face, 
need to provide such an experience if they deserve to be called learning or educational 
institutions24. However to suggest as the author does that “one of the issues that can 
be taken as an example” of the challenge in education is to “question whether in a 
democracy citizens should be free to vote or not to vote in national elections or for 
elections for the European parliament” is an understatement and misses the point 
(p.76). Voting is important but conjunctural. Caruana paradoxically demolishes any 
educational value in discussing voting: “if citizens do not take up their duty to vote, 
they are forfeiting their responsibility in upholding popular sovereignty as has already 
been argued” (p.76). Question opened, question closed. And there is no appeal: 
“adopting a laissez-faire attitude including deciding not to exercise the right to vote 
(…) will get no one anywhere’ (p.76). This approach, I argue, will in fact get us 
nowhere and at this point we break off from the essay and present a triad of concepts 
in order to radically transform the platform over which a new political programme can 
be built.  
 
6. A tentative, but radically different approach based on the triad: state, 
economy and culture 
 
(a) The state and education 
 
The concept of the state is basic, it is argued, to discuss meaningfully democracy. 
Taking from Poulantzas (1975) his instrumentally useful structural elaboration of the 
state, we can thus place the schools in the function-related locus reserved for them. 
The state ‘condenses’ the fundamental relations amongst the social groups and the 
success of this condensation is basic to the health of the state which can, in this way, 
mediate through its institutions the contradictions characterising these relations. The 
State however is not neutral, as some liberals claim (or desire). It remains essentially a 
‘terrain’ of power relations that determine, amongst others, a substantial part of what 
goes into schools or is left out. Cohesion is therefore basic for the peaceful 
reproduction at the economic and political levels of the social order that accords with 
                                                 
24
 See Wain (2006) for differences between learning and education.  
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the fundamental class relations as established at the level of state power. Schools are 
there essentially, but not exclusively, for the ‘reproductive’ purpose. They do not 
repress as the army or prisons but perform at the ideological level25. Schools as state 
politico-ideological apparatuses do not possess power on their own account and so do 
not determine class divisions as such but they do contribute to them. In fact as the 
context for democratic education, schools can take us to the very heart of the state, an 
ideal context for critical reflection. At the same time (but just as importantly) the 
study of school helps us remove the ‘ghostly’ nature of ‘state’ discourse. On the other 
hand, the absence of discussion makes it a disturbing experience.  
 
If any class or section attempts to change the balance of power in the relations 
‘condensed’ within the state it cannot effectively do so merely on the basis of 
providing educational programmes that complement its efforts. Even acquiring 
executive democratic governmental power, a favourite theme in Caruana’s essay, on 
the basis of citizens’ votes is not enough. In fact although the newly-acquired power 
determines the role and functions of apparatuses, unless the sector or class it 
represents changes the apparatuses, then there will be no radical change from what 
went on before. A social class, of course, cannot even think of achieving this unless it 
captures those apparatuses through the acquisition of state power in the first place. 
Only then argues Poulantzas, can it think of proceeding to demolish and rebuild them. 
This has nothing to do with the physical demolishment or organisational regrouping 
of schools or institutes set up by one party in government following another. Such 
practices give too much credit to institutional determination. If it was like that, all it 
takes to ‘repair’ is to reform institutions, here and there. However the power relations 
we spoke about earlier occur beyond the limits not only of the school, but even that of 
parliament and all other sorts of institutions and apparatuses. It is at the level of the 
capitalist mode of production (CMP) that we get a comprehensive vision of the field. 
The CMP however has to be reproduced within a social formation, thus presupposing 
the reproduction of social relations. In turn this means political and ideological 
reproduction and therefore the apparatuses.26 This remains the latter’s contribution 
and claim to be taken seriously. This briefly sketched theoretical structure should 
make clear that the triad is really a unity, the elements of which are only separated for 
the purposes of explanation. 
 
(b) The economic factor 
 
Politics is not immune from the attractions of the economy as one elicits from 
Briguglio’s good governance criterion part of the attraction potential for his economic 
resilience index which, it can be argued, aims at embedding the interest of capital, big 
and small, into the democratic polity.27 The US and the EU have become masters in 
devising agreements using ‘democracy’ - their kind - as a requirement for others to 
                                                 
25
 A middle class prerogative. Ideological apparatuses can repress and repressive apparatuses can have 
an ideological role but this is a secondary function. 
26
 Further explanation, beyond the reach of this paper from, Poulantzas (1975), especially Part II of the 
Introduction, pp.24-8. 
27
 Failure to safeguard the rule of law and security of property rights reduce resilience. Briguglio also 
refers to the Economic Freedom of the World Index which covers five aspects of governance: judicial 
independence, court impartiality, protection of intellectual property rights, military interference in the 
rule of law and political system, and integrity of the legal system. L. Briguglio et al (eds.) (2006), 
p.275. In other words, once you tie the hands of sovereign states with international legislation, then you 
have them on a platter. 
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receive aid. A certain strand in liberal amnesia may make us forget that the economy 
also thrives on strong relations with the educational sector. In other words, seeing 
democracy and citizenship (and relative educational programmes) merely as training 
in practising the right to vote and some other such rituals is putting on the blinkers. 
Human capital theory can express very clearly the close encounters between education 
and economy or, more pertinently, the perception of education as a subsidiary for 
economic needs.  
 
According to Sultana (1997), human capital theory has been “very influential” in 
Malta “irrespective of whoever was in government” and in spite of ideological and 
other differences (p.335). This consistency (or, perhaps, consistent inconsistency as 
should emerge shortly) is reflected in Vella’s (1995) argument about post-war 
economic policy in Malta. “The Maltese policy-maker”, he wrote, “has never 
seriously questioned orthodox concepts of development” and so political economic 
policy has developed in a paradigmatic continuity (p.56). But to understand this, one 
has to disengage from the ideological paradigms of Left and Right, which coloured 
the diversity in the official formulations and practical implementation: the 
“unexplainable gap” between the ideologically motivated squabbling about policy-
making and what was actually being followed (p.56). Thus, our political and 
economic experiences in the post-war period as a developing country on the 
peripheries of the European macro-region have followed a paradigmatic continuity 
which is interesting because during the same period there were diverse and 
contrasting official formulations and practical implementations of educational policy 
in response, it was claimed, to the purported needs of the Maltese economy. It was 
another case of Right-Left dichotomy, hybridised on a common human capital  
platform.28  
 
Our ‘catching up’ capitalist economic development has on the whole, we are led to 
believe, contributed quite positively to the general welfare of the population providing 
opportunities for the materialisation of liberating aspirations (profit-making for some, 
wage-earning for many of the rest). Based on Sultana’s research, Giddens (1995) does 
not believe there is an underclass in Malta such as in the USA and other European 
nations although the immigrant influx into the labour market has to be assessed. 
However the “increasingly pervasive influence of market philosophies” indicates it 
may only be a question of time or a factor that remains undetected (p.xxxi). 
Influenced and in turn affected by family and gender changes in society, the labour 
market changes but it cannot be taken as an absolute; instead it is better to compare 
with others. In this case, fewer Maltese women are in paid employment than 
elsewhere in Western Europe affecting the male breadwinner role which in turn faces 
a decline in life-time jobs and the reduction of those in the state sector, a phenomenon 
which leaves an impact on the private sector. Unionisation survives but the 
democratic participation experiments have broken down and new managerial ideas 
have taken their place - empowerment of the workers, job enlargement, quality 
circles, democratisation of the workplace - highly rhetorical even if backed by the 
latest university-promoted theoretical schemes of worker control and labour squeeze 
techniques. 
 
(c) The cultural factor 
                                                 
28
 Germani quoted in Vella (1995), p.56 
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Where does democratic and citizenship education fit in all this? “Democracy survives 
when the people choose it as their system of government, and it is always given a 
different moulding, depending on many aspects including the culture of the country 
where it is put into practice” (Caruana, 2006: 71). If we brush aside the ‘people 
choosing their system’ opiate, Caruana is right in paying attention to culture and how 
this predisposes our character. The culture argument seems to move back and forth 
between the polarised ideas of economism on one side whereby culture adjusts to the 
dictates of economic determinants, a typical capitalist strategy as outlined by the study 
of Fordism, and on the other, cultural pluralism, mostly Eurocentric cultures, held to 
be constants.  The former is represented by the substitution of God in precapitalist 
worldviews with capitalist Progress significantly manifested in impressive material 
developments. In this way capitalism liberated the democratic potential but at the 
same time put it into a straightjacket with its economistic regulatory principle.  Are 
our patterns of work and leisure producing a false consciousness in which, Amin 
(1976) asks, “all aspects of life are subject to the fundamental requirement that labour 
power be reproduced as a commodity”? (p.79) Leisure becomes “functional 
recuperation” and, adds Amin, is “socially organised” (p.79). In Amin’s critique, talk 
about “the free individual” is ultimately part of the “heaven of ideas”, a product of 
false consciousness whereby “the hell of reality is compensated for by the heaven of 
ideas”. (p.78)  
 
Immiseration today in the developed world does not mean living without enough 
income to pay for survival needs. It means that what was gained in the third quarter of 
the last century is eroded. Those gains, at least in Western Europe, were the result of a 
mix of Keynesian economic policies and strong class consciousness. Once 
deterioration is perceived, can one blame it on anybody that the ‘cultural’ legitimacy 
of democracy is undermined? It will not be easily undermined because labour-capital 
compromise in the advanced industrial nations is strong, to the detriment of labour in 
the peripheries. But if the balance is disrupted, massive capital leaving the OECD fold 
for example, then there will be problems. Meanwhile labour is asked to tidy up its act 
or fall. University outreach programmes and unemployment agencies will be hard at 
work to patch this up. And what do the liberals offer? It is already difficult to 
understand how, with their traditional bias for individual rights (not bad in itself, but 
ultimately ineffective without the guarantee of economic and social rights), they can 
protect middle class losses, let alone consider what happens to those occupying lower 
social sectors. Against this backdrop, freedom of individual rights sounds hollow. 
Liberal communitarianism as a substitute for self-complacent individualism, 
Caruana’s ‘integration’ of the individual “with the communitarian feeling, with a 
feeling of sharing and giving rather than only receiving” (p.75) appears to be itself a 
poor, enfeebled substitute for a more emasculated class consciousness. 
 
Extending individual rights to all, bolstering them further through liberal programmes 
of education and at the same time continue to expect the ‘market’ to take care of 
economic activity means ignoring the real consideration that the market is not a 
democratic concern (unless for minimum regulations to control exaggerations). 
Besides the consideration that democracy and the market do not imply one another, at 
least not in the real world, there is also the consideration that globalised economic 
forces do not bow to the market – they control it. Perhaps in the world of ‘democratic 
governance’ selling, index-quoting economists, there is a place to conveniently place 
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markets and democracy side by side. A broader perspective presents the relation 
between (political) power and (economic) wealth as not a stable one. Power (i.e. the 
political branch) was the source of wealth (i.e. the economic arm) in sixteenth century 
capitalism but the relation has been overturned. The increasing separation between the 
two has meant that managing state power was set apart from managing the 
accumulation of capital. Meanwhile, the promises of politics are cooled down by the 
reality of capitalist profit, and the best one can do is to opt for economic alienation, 
which privileges human liberty over other values and not only equality. 
 
Democracy as a fossilised system may be inserted in the bargain. But our point is that 
one talks meaningfully when one talks about democratisation rather than a static 
reality. Democratic development has been the result of many factors but certainly one 
of these has been resistance or rebellion from within, promoted by classes that were 
not ready to bow to the system at the time, bourgeois revolution against absolutist 
politics in France, the fairy-tale of liberalism built upon concrete popular support, and 
the working class reaction against excesses in China and Russia. With the 1989 fall of 
the Soviet system, neoliberal writers of the West could not believe their luck. One 
could now start to erode the gains of the postwar social struggles in Europe. Those 
who resisted were associated with crumbling Eastern European socialism 
notwithstanding that in the West, since the 1950s there had been a rejection, excluding 
only a few die-hards, of the Soviet model. The European project celebrated this year 
has to acquire a character that could liberate it from the double identity it has carried 
since its birth. Started as a compromise to appease the threat of the working classes 
after the war, it turned into a social democracy which guaranteed favourable 
conditions for the workers that went beyond purely economic capitalism. On the other 
hand, the same threat pushed the western European countries into the fold of 
American global interests with all its military and transnational capital appendages. If 
it is going to be democratic politics within the triad we have proposed -state, 
economy, culture - then our students could always start from here. 
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